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LITIGATING AN EPIDEMIC: CALIFORNIA
PLAINTIFFS IN THE NATIONAL OPIOID
LITIGATION
Samantha T. Pannier*
Can litigation solve a public health epidemic? The opioid epidemic
has cost California 24,885 lives, 1 $4.3 billion, and counting.2 As a result,
over 500 California cities, counties,3 and sovereign Indian tribes4 are
engaged in civil litigation against over twenty different opioid
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for their role in creating
and profiting from an epidemic of addiction. Cases brought by California
plaintiffs account for about 20 percent of all ongoing opioid litigation
nationally.5 This Note situates the claims of three California plaintiffs—
the State, the County of Mariposa, and the City of Los Angeles—within
the context of the ongoing national opioid litigation, compares them to
previous successful Big Tobacco litigation, and discusses what plaintiffs
should do to retain both their ability to control claims and any potential
settlement or judgment funds.

* J.D. Candidate 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks to Dean Brietta Clark
for her insight and guidance, Professor Adam Zimmerman for his procedural expertise, the Volume
53 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Developments team, Volume 54 staffers, and any and all
professors, teachers, supervising attorneys, and friends past and future who have ever taken a red
pen to my work—thank you for helping me and my writing grow.
1. California Opioid Overdose Surveillance Dashboard, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
https://discovery.cdph.ca.gov/CDIC/ODdash/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [hereinafter California
Opioid Dashboard]. Cumulative data were collected and analyzed by author, raw data are publicly
available, and data analysis is available upon request. Corroborated by California: Opioid-Involved
Deathsand Related Harms, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.drugabuse
.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state/california-opioid-summary.
2. Thomas Hale & Sarah DiSalvo, The Opioid Epidemic: An Economic Overview in the State
of California, CAL. STATE TREASURER’S OFF. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/@catreasurer
/the-opioid-epidemic-an-economic-overview-in-the-state-of-california-ad7a5d4558d0.
3. Jose A. Del Real, Sick River: Can These California Tribes Beat Heroin and History?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/klamath-river-california-tribesheroin.html.
4. Id.
5. At the time of writing, California cities and counties alone accounted for 539 of 2,500
local government claims consolidated in the Northern District of Ohio. See Frequently Asked
Questions, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG., https://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.inf
o/Home/FAQ#faq9 (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [hereinafter FAQ, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION
OPIATES LITIG.].
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I. INTRODUCTION TO AN EPIDEMIC: HOW DID WE GET HERE?
In an opioid overdose, the drug overwhelms the central nervous
system.6 Specifically, it targets the part of the user’s brain responsible
for breathing.7 Eventually, the respiratory system becomes so
depressed that the user suffocates.8 On average, 128 Americans—six
Californians—die this way every day.9
In fall 2017, the opioid epidemic officially became a public health
emergency.10 Unlike naturally occurring epidemic diseases, such as
influenza or HIV/AIDS, the distinctive characteristic of the opioid
crisis is its principal mode of transmission: human malfeasance.11
Opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies (collectively
“opioid defendants”) created a highly addictive product and presented
it to the public as safe when they knew it was not.12 Drug manufacturer
Purdue Pharma’s “blockbuster” opioid, OxyContin, is perhaps the
most well-known of all name-brand and generic opioids.13

6. Opioid Overdose Basics: What Is an Overdose?, NAT’L HARM REDUCTION COAL.,
https://harmreduction.org/issues/overdose-prevention/overview/overdose-basics/what-is-anoverdose/ (last modified Sept. 1, 2020).
7. ELIZABETH Y. SCHILLER ET AL., OPIOID OVERDOSE 7–8 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470415/?report=reader#_NBK470415_pubdet_ (last
updated Nov. 20, 2020).
8. Id.
9. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-bystate/california-opioid-summary (daily crude averages calculated by author using data from CDC
WONDER, California n = 2,410/365 and United States n = 46,802/365).
10. Letter from Eric D. Hargan, Acting Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%20Decla
ration-no-sig.pdf; see also 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (2018).
11. See Harriet Ryan et al., ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ Oxycontin’s 12-Hour Problem,
L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/; Kim Christensen,
Purdue Pharma Sought to Divert Online Readers from Critical L.A. Times Series on Opioid Crisis,
Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/
2019-08-14/purdue-pharma-coverage-divert-opioid-crisis; U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS. COMM., FUELING AN EPIDEMIC 2 (2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&d
id=808171.
12. Ryan et al., supra note 11.
13. OxyContin is so ubiquitous that the terms “oxy” and “perky” frequent pop music lyrics
extolling the drugs’ recreational opioid use. See, e.g., Oxy, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Future-oxylyrics (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); Ben Beaumont-Thomas, The Death of Lil Peep: How the US
Prescription Drug Epidemic Is Changing Hip-Hop, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2017/nov/16/death-lil-peep-us-prescription-drugs-epidemichip-hop-rapper. Oxycontin’s popularity is frequently described in the same terms as a successful
film, a “blockbuster.” See German Lopez, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for
Bankruptcy, VOX (Sept. 16, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/9/16/20868487/purdue-pharma-oxycontin-bankruptcy-opioid-epidemic.
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OxyContin’s story is a useful example of how over the course of two
decades opioids managed to reshape American life.
Prior to OxyContin—and the wave of new opioids that
followed—most pain medication was designed to be immediately
released and absorbed into the body.14 Patients receive the whole dose
of opioids all at once.15 As a result, pain is treated almost immediately,
but the medication wears off quickly, and side effects are strong.16
OxyContin’s innovation was its extended release formula, which
supposedly released smaller amounts of the drug into the body slowly
over a longer period of time.17 OxyContin’s extended release formula
broadened the opioid consumer market from patients experiencing
acute, intense pain to America’s fifty million chronic pain sufferers.18
Purdue’s marketing materials to physicians and patients promised
that OxyContin’s “delayed absorption” formula prevented users from
dependence and abuse. 19 Until 2001, the label on OxyContin’s box
read: “Delayed absorption as provided by OxyContin tablets, is
believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.”20 This statement was
the keystone to Purdue’s aggressive and, as the plaintiffs allege, false
and misleading marketing campaign directed at doctors and the public
at large.21

14. Charles E. Argoff & Daniel I. Silvershein, A Comparison of Long- and Short-Acting
Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Noncancer Pain: Tailoring Therapy to Meet Patient Needs,
84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 602, 603 (2009).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See Ryan et al., supra note 11.
18. James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain
Among Adults—United States, 2016, 67 CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1001, 1002 (Sept. 14,2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/w
r/pdfs/mm6736a2-H.pdf; Argoff & Silvershein, supra note 14, at 604.
19. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 224 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/art
icles/PMC2622774/#bib49; Marilyn Bulloch, How Oxycodone Has Contributed to the Opioid
Epidemic, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contrib
utor/marilyn-bulloch-pharmd-bcps/2018/08/how-oxycodone-has-contributed-to-the-opioidepidemic.
20. Caitlin Esch, How One Sentence Helped Set Off the Opioid Crisis, MARKETPLACE
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/12/13/opioid/; Van Zee, supra note 19, at 224;
Bulloch, supra note 19.
21. David Armstrong, Secret Trove Reveals Bold ‘Crusade’ to Make OxyContin a
Blockbuster, STAT (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/22/abbott-oxycontincrusade/; Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, THE NEW YORKER
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-anempire-of-pain.
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Purdue’s claim about OxyContin’s lack of addictive properties
rested on shaky scientific ground: a single Purdue-funded study prior
to the drug’s launch in 1996.22 The statement remained on
OxyContin’s label from the drug’s launch in 1996 until 2001 when the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forced Purdue to replace it with
a “Black Box Warning,” the strongest warning possible for a drug.23
The warning includes recommended dosing restrictions, notices about
the risk of abuse, diversion,24 and the risk of “fatal respiratory
depression.”25 But by then, the epidemic was already in motion. One
study found that “[f]rom 1997 to 2002, OxyContin prescriptions
increased from 670,000 to 6.2 million.”26 At the height of opioid
prescription-writing in 2002, Purdue made more than $1 billion on
OxyContin alone.27
For
their
part,
distributors
like
McKesson
and
AmerisourceBergen corporations, which supply pharmacies,
hospitals, and clinics with medical equipment including
pharmaceuticals, are accused of neglecting to report suspicious orders

22. Robert F. Reder et al., Steady-State Bioavailability of Controlled-Release Oxycodone in
Normal Subjects, 18 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 95, 95–105 (1996); Bulloch, supra note 19.
23. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and
Abuse, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/timelineselected-fda-activities-and-significant-events-addressing-opioid-misuse-and-abuse (last visited
Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Opioid Misuse Timeline]; FDA Issues New Warnings on Painkiller
OxyContin, WEBMD (July 26, 2001), https://www.webmd.com/pain-management/news/
20010726/fda-issues-new-warnings-on-painkiller-oxycontin#1; Sujata S. Jayawant & Rajesh
Balkrishnan, The Controversy Surrounding OxyContin Abuse: Issues and Solutions, 1
THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 77, 78, 80 (2005); Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr., Drug
Utilization Rev. Program Manager, to Prescribers (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.health.ny.gov/he
alth_care/medicaid/program/dur/communications/2010/08/oxycontin_letter_final.pdf [hereinafter
Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr.]; Michelle Llamas, Black Box Warnings, DRUGWATCH,
https://www.drugwatch.com/fda/black-box-warnings/ (last modified Apr. 13, 2020); Flyer, A
Guide to Drug Safety Terms at FDA, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 2 (Nov. 2012),
https://www.fda.gov/media/74382/download.
24. Diversion is “any activity whereby legitimately made controlled substances that
are intended to be used for lawful purposes are sold or exchanged in the illegitimate drug market
as illicit substances. Controlled substances are contained in Drug Schedules I–V and are regulated
by DEA.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL
THE DIVERSION OF OPIOIDS 1 n.2 (2019), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/e1905.pdf.
25. Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr., supra note 23; Jayawant & Balkrishnan, supra note 23, at
78.
26. Mark R. Jones et al., A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain
Medicine, 7 PAIN & THERAPY 13, 16 (2018).
27. Armstrong, supra note 21.
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to state and federal authorities, failing to prevent diversion, and
flooding communities with readily accessible prescription opioids.28
Likewise, pharmacies are also accused of diverting and filling
millions of prescriptions that they directly profited from but put their
patients at risk.29 Walgreens even gave their pharmacists bonuses for
filling high numbers of opioid prescriptions.30
Now, as the opioid crisis continues and worsens, 31 state and local
governments, labor unions, and even water districts are suing opioid
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies using a variety of claims
and theories of liability to varying degrees of success.32 California is
no stranger to the epidemic, nor its litigation. On average, six
Californians die from an opioid-related overdose every day.33
As of this Note, there are at least 539 active lawsuits between
California government plaintiffs and opioid manufacturers,
distributors, and pharmacies.34 In total, about 20 percent of all ongoing
opioid cases are brought by California plaintiffs.35 Nationally, local
government plaintiffs rather than states predominate.36 As competition
for control of state law claims and any judgment or settlement money

28. Nathaniel Weixel, Oklahoma Sues Three Major Opioid Distributors, THE HILL (Jan. 13,
2020, 5:42 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/478067-oklahoma-sues-three-major-opioiddistributors; Complaint at 134–36, City of Los Angeles v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-op-45601DAP (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter City of Los Angeles Complaint].
29. Complaint at 92–95, County of Mariposa v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 18-op45618-DAP (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter County of Mariposa Complaint].
30. Jenn Abelson et al., At Height of Crisis, Walgreens Handled Nearly One in Five of the
Most Addictive Opioids, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investig
ations/2019/11/07/height-crisis-walgreens-handled-nearly-one-five-most-addictiveopioids/?arc404=true.
31. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence That the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting Worse,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 16, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-muchthe-opioid-epidemic-costs-the-us-2017-10-27.
32. Andrew Harris et al., Justice for Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday for Their
Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioidlawsuits/; Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (and Massively Complex) Opioid Litigation,
NPR (Oct. 15, 2019, 9:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/761537367/
your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation.
33. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, supra note 9.
34. Shayna Posses, Calif. Tribes Become Latest to Bring Opioid Crisis Suits, LAW360
(Oct. 17, 2018, 6:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093089/calif-tribes-become-latestto-bring-opioid-crisis-suits; see Home, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG.,
https://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.info/Home/FAQ#faq9 [hereinafter Entities of the Negotiation
Class] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (click “Cities and Counties” hyperlink); Del Real, supra note 3.
35. See supra note 5; Dwyer, supra note 32.
36. See Morgan A. McCollum, Note, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid MultiDistrict Litigation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 938, 942–43 (2019).
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grows, tensions between cities, counties, and their state governments
are rising.37
The opioid litigation is about two things: control of claims and
control of settlement or judgment money. California plaintiffs,
especially local governments, have learned the lessons of previous
public health litigation. By joining with other local governments
across the state and country, California cities and counties have
learned how to consolidate both their claims and their bargaining
power.38 However, it remains to be seen whether California plaintiffs
have learned the lessons of previous public health settlements. Many
California government plaintiffs continue to receive payments from
public health settlements, yet very few actually apply those payments
to public health programs.39
While litigation cannot solve the epidemic, it can provide the
means to end it. First, litigation can provide accountability and show
us how we got here. An open and public process like a trial can hold
opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies accountable for
creating and profiting from the epidemic, expose corporate
malfeasance by making internal corporate documents public, and
attempt to put a dollar value on the psychological, emotional, and
economic toll the epidemic has taken on communities around the
country. Second, litigation can provide the funds necessary for
governments and opioid defendants to chart a course out of the
epidemic. The increasing procedural complexity of the opioid
litigation and the public and political attention may exert enough
pressure on the parties that they will come to a global settlement
agreement rather than continue litigation. Settlement or a judgment in
37. Andrew J. Tobias & Eric Heisig, Gov. Mike DeWine, Seeking to Ease Tensions in Opioid
Litigation, Holds Talks at Mansion with AG Yost, Local Leaders, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2019/10/gov-mike-dewine-seeking-to-ease-tensions-inopioid-litigation-holds-talks-at-mansion-with-ag-yost-local-leaders.html.
38. McCollum, supra note 36, at 947–48.
39. See A State-by-State Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement 21 Years Later, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport (last updated
Jan. 16, 2020) [hereinafter State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later]; Micah L. Berman,
Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons from the Tobacco Experience, 67 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1038 (2019); Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Payments
Received by State, Counties, and Cities 1999–2020, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y
Gen. 20, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/settlements/tmsapc-1999-2019.pdf
(last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020]; Actual Annual
Tobacco Settlement Payments Received by the States, 1998–2020, Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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favor of the plaintiffs can be used to fund long-term addiction
treatment, prevention, and other public health programs that will, over
time, abate the public health crisis.
As the likelihood of settlement with the opioid defendants
grows,40 how the State of California and its local governments choose
to divide and spend these limited funds matters both to Californians
and as a model to other states, cities, and counties. However, an
effective use of such funds can only be achieved if California plaintiffs
appreciate the lessons of previous public health litigation. The
blueprint for such litigation and settlement exists. The Big Tobacco
suits of the 1990s provide California plaintiffs a beginner’s guide to
massive, complex public health litigation and settlement. Unlike the
funds from the Big Tobacco litigation, California and its cities and
counties should start planning now to protect and use settlement funds
or judgment money to end the opioid epidemic. Just as in the Big
Tobacco litigation, a memorandum of understanding between the state
and local governments about the division of funds between different
levels of government could be agreed upon before settlement with
opioid defendants. California plaintiffs should also take action now to
protect any settlement or judgment funds from non-public health
expenditures through a statute, referendums and ballot initiatives, and
public health mandates within the terms of any settlement agreement.
Part II of this Note will describe the current state of the public
health crisis and how the courts are managing the legal response. Part
III will discuss previous public health litigation and settlement, and
compare the claims, conflicts, and goals of three different California
government plaintiffs as test cases: Mariposa County, the City of Los
Angeles, and the State of California. Part IV concludes by suggesting
methods for protecting public health funds generated by litigation or
settlement from misappropriation by state and local legislative bodies.

40. See Jan Hoffman, Payout from a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as Hoped,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-opioidsettlement.html.

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/19/21 2:46 PM

LITIGATING AN OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN CALIFORNIA

283

II. FACTUAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH BACKGROUND
A. Public Health Emergency
Epidemics are characterized by a sudden increase in disease
occurrence in a population.41 In some communities, the opioid
epidemic is so common it is essentially endemic.42 In 2018, 45 percent,
or 2,410 of all fatal drug overdoses in California, involved opioids.43
In the same year, 69 percent of all fatal drug overdoses nation-wide
involved opioids.44 The epidemic is evolving so rapidly that
comprehensive professional guidelines governing the prescription of
opioids in order to prevent addiction were not released until 2016 and
2017.45
Opium-derived medications are essential to the modern practice
of medicine and have been since the nineteenth century.46 Despite
their usefulness and in some cases medical necessity, opioids’
addictive qualities have been known since their discovery, wreaked
havoc on communities, and caused wars.47
41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY AND BIOSTATISTICS 1–72
(3rd ed. 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/Lesson1/Section11.html#_ref47 (stating
“[m]ore specifically, an epidemic may result from: [1] a recent increase in amount or virulence of
the agent, [2] [t]he recent introduction of the agent into a setting where it has not been before, [3]
[a]n enhanced mode of transmission so that more susceptible persons are exposed, [4] [a] change
in the susceptibility of the host response to the agent, and/or [5] [f]actors that increase host exposure
or involve introduction through new portals of entry”).
42. See Robin Young, In Township Ravaged by Opioids, Educators Create Program to Help
Kids Cope, WBUR (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2019/09/25/minford-ohioopioids-schools; Nicole Gastala, Denial: The Greatest Barrier to the Opioid Epidemic, 15 ANNALS
FAM. MED. 372, 372–74 (2017).
43. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, supra note 9 (age-adjusted rate
of 5.8 per 100,000); Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/DRUGOVERDOSE/DATA/STATEDEATHS.HTML (last reviewed Mar. 1
9, 2020) (age-adjusted rate of 12.8 per 100,000).
44. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43 (n = 46,802/67,367).
45. See Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Responsible, Safe, and Effective Prescription of Opioids
for Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (ASIPP)
Guidelines, 20 PAIN PHYSICIAN 3, S45–S63 (2017); Michael J. Brownstein, A Brief History of
Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 5391, 5391
(1993). See generally Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic
Pain—United States, 2016, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1624, 1624 (2016).
46. Brownstein, supra note 45, at 5391; Ramtin Arablouei & Rund Abdelfatah, A History of
Opioids in America, NPR (Apr. 4, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/04/709767408/ahistory-of-opioids-in-america.
47. Kenneth Pletcher, Opium Wars, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars (last visited Dec. 21, 2020); Rebecca Delfino, Just
What the Doctor Ordered: A New Federal Statute to Criminalize Physicians for Overprescribing
Opioids, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2021), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3535943.
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The origins of the present crisis are now relatively wellunderstood.48 Initially, opioids were only prescribed for acute cancerrelated or short-term high-intensity pain relief.49 In the 1990s,
prescriptions of hydrocodone and oxycodone for ordinary pain
increased.50 After the development of extended release opioids, like
OxyContin, manufacturers’ marketing strategies encouraged doctors
to expand the market and prescribe the drug for a wider variety of
maladies from run-of-the-mill arthritis to sports injuries.51 This
behavior occurred at the same time physicians began to think of pain
as “the fifth vital sign” alongside basic signs of life like heart rate and
blood pressure.52 However, around 2012, prescriptions decreased as
governments and prescribers recognized the drug’s addictive
qualities.53 As a result, many new addicts found their prescriptions cut
off, and they needed to feed their addiction through other means.
Heroin use, which was at its lowest point in years prior to the opioid
epidemic, spiked.54 The market demand for heroin and synthetic
opioids increased markedly.55 Synthetic opioids (drugs like fentanyl,
fentanyl analogs, and tramadol) are chemically manufactured, often
illicitly in countries like China, and can be ordered online for delivery
by mail.56 They are often much stronger than their licit FDA-regulated
48. See Jones et al., supra note 26, at 13–21; Lindsy Liu et al., History of the Opioid Epidemic:
How Did We Get Here?, NAT’L CAP. POISON CTR., https://www.poison.org/articles/opioidepidemic-history-and-prescribing-patterns-182 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); THE NAT’L ACADS. OF
SCIS. ENG’G MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 2–3 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds.,
2017) [hereinafter PAIN MANAGEMENT].
49. Argoff & Silvershein, supra note 14, at 602–03.
50. Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 562 (2015),
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957.
51. Id. at 562–63; Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last reviewed Mar. 19,
2020) (Brand names for these drugs include but are not limited to, Vicodin and OxyContin, and the
names have even found their way into pop culture); PAIN MANAGEMENT, supra note 48, at 25–26.
52. Jones et al., supra note 26, at 15.
53. Id.; Opioid Misuse Timeline, supra note 23.
54. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43; Kolodny et al., supra note 50, at 560–62; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., DEA-DCT-DIR-007-20, 2019 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT 9–20 (2019), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/2019-NDTA-final-0114-2020_Low_Web-DIR-007-20_2019.pdf; Theodore J. Cicero et al., The Changing Face of
Heroin Use in the United States: A Retrospective Analysis of Past 50 Years, 71 J. AM. MED. ASS’ N
PSYCHIATRY 821, 823 (2014).
55. Cicero et al., supra note 54, at 825.
56. Steven Lee Myers, China Cracks Down on Fentanyl. But Is It Enough to End the U.S.
Epidemic?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/asia/china-
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equivalents and even street-bought heroin.57 Due to the strength of
synthetics and their widespread availability, overdoses have spiked.58
Fig. 1 Opioid-related Deaths in California, 2006–2018

Despite increased visibility through public health campaigns,
government efforts, and journalistic scrutiny, California’s crisis is not
actually getting better, it is getting worse. The age-adjusted rate of
drug overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids increased between
2016 and 2017 by forty-five percent.59 In response, the state launched
public health initiatives and passed legislation to provide access to

fentanyl-crackdown.html; Scott Pelley, Deadly Fentanyl Bought Online from China Being Shipped
Through the Mail, CBS NEWS (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/deadly-fentanylbought-online-from-china-being-shipped-through-the-mail-60-minutes-2019-09-15/; Holly
Hedegaard et al., Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db329.htm (last
reviewed Nov. 29, 2018).
57. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43; Synthetic
Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dru
goverdose/data/fentanyl.html (last reviewed Mar. 19, 2020).
58. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43.
59. From 6.2 deaths to 9.0 per 100,000 persons. Hedegaard et al., supra note 56; Data
Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/dat
a/ (last reviewed Dec. 7, 2020).
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addiction treatment, education, data sharing, and monitoring.60
Another strategy has also emerged: litigation.
B. The Opioid Litigation So Far
While current civil suits have gotten the most attention, opioid
litigation has been ongoing since the millennium. The first wave of
opioid litigation crested in the mid-2000s.61 It centered on
manufacturers and over-prescribing doctors.62 Among other theories,
these early suits alleged products liability, fraud, negligence, and
breach of implied warranties.63 In 2007, three Purdue executives
pleaded guilty to federal misbranding charges, and the company paid
over $600 million to the Justice Department in settlement to close the
investigation.64 In 2014, California’s Santa Clara and Orange Counties
sued seven manufacturers for false advertising65 and successfully
settled with one, while the rest of the case was stayed pending FDA
determinations.66 Unfortunately, these early lawsuits and settlements
did not stem the crisis nor changed defendants’ behavior.67
Manufacturers’ sales teams continued aggressively marketing even to
the point of bribing doctors in exchange for prescriptions.68
60. Sammy Caiola, Here Are California’s New Laws to Address the State’s Opioid Crisis,
CAPRADIO (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2019/01/16/here-are-californias-newlaws-to-address-the-states-opioid-crisis/.
61. See In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1388, 1388 (J.P.M.L. 2004).
62. Id. at 1389.
63. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a
National Health Crisis 4 (Mar. 6, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313
5410 (research paper).
64. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html.
65. People v. Purdue Pharma, No. 201400725287, 2015 WL 5123273, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 27, 2015); California v. Purdue Pharma, No. SACV 14-1080-JLS (DFMx), 2014 WL
6065907, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014).
66. John Kennedy, Teva to Pay $1.6M to Resolve Calif. Counties’ Opioid Suit, LAW360
(May 25, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/928559/teva-to-pay-1-6m-to-resolvecalif-counties-opioid-suit.
67. See Sam Stanton, Feds Target McKesson Plant in West Sacramento Over ‘Suspicious’
Opioid Sales, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 2, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/busin
ess/article233449717.html; Abelson et al., supra note 30; Mark Morales, Former Purdue Pharma
President Called Addicted People ‘Victimizers’ in Emails, CNN (May 8, 2019, 6:04 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/health/sackler-purdue-opioid-emails/index.html; David
Armstrong, Inside Purdue Pharma’s Media Playbook: How It Planted the Opioid “Anti-Story”,
PRO PUBLICA (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-purduepharma-media-playbook-how-it-planted-the-opioid-anti-story.
68. Andrew Joseph, ‘A Blizzard of Prescriptions’: Documents Reveal New Details About
Purdue’s Marketing of OxyContin, STAT (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/15/
massachusetts-purdue-lawsuit-new-details/; Gabrielle Emanuel, Pharmaceutical Executives Face
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The second wave of litigation, and the focus of this Note, consists
of civil litigation initiated by government plaintiffs like cities,
counties, and states, and targets the profit-making behavior that drove
the epidemic. Governments seek injunctive relief to abate the crisis
and damages for the cost of paying for the opioid crisis on a large scale
including the cost of adapting and retrofitting hospitals, jails, police
forces, and medical examiners’ services and facilities to cope with and
combat the epidemic.69 Defendants fall into three categories: (1)
manufacturers that developed and aggressively marketed opioids; (2)
distributors that sent large quantities of the opioids to pharmacies,
hospitals, and clinics; and (3) commercial pharmacies that filled and
refilled prescriptions for addicts, all the while billing their insurance if
they had it, and leaving the state to pick up the cost if consumers were
uninsured.70
1. The National Picture: the Multidistrict Litigation, the Negotiation
Class, and the States
a. The Multidistrict Litigation
The opioid plaintiffs are a massive and diverse group. They
consist of all manner of local governments, Indian tribes, labor unions,
and even fire departments, and their cases are scattered among courts
all over the country.71 The two groups with the most negotiation
leverage are the focus of this Note: local governments (cities and
counties) and states.
Procedurally, the opioid litigation presents huge challenges to the
judicial system. Nationally, there are more than 1,900 active cases
involving local governments and states.72 The majority of these cases
Prison Time in Case Linked to Opioid Crisis, NPR (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/01/13/795200200/pharmaceutical-executives-face-prison-time-in-case-linked-to-opioidcrisis. See generally Delfino, supra note 47 (discussing criminal charges against opioid
prescribers).
69. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 248–51.
70. See Jan Hoffman et al., 3,271 Pill Bottles, a Town of 2,831: Court Filings Say
Corporations Fed Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
07/19/health/opioids-trial-addiction-drugstores.html.
71. McCollum, supra note 36, at 968–70; see also Gluck et al., supra note 63, at 17 (“It is
unusual that the transferring panel was willing to group so many different kinds of defendants into
the single MDL. . . . The transferring court, however, seemed to prefer a comprehensive action to
get at a comprehensive solution.”).
72. Jan Hoffman, Groundwork Is Laid for Opioids Settlement That Would Touch Every
Corner of U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/health/opioidslawsuit-settlement.html.
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have been consolidated through a process called multidistrict
litigation.73
Multidistrict litigation, commonly known as an MDL, is a
procedural tool created by Congress in 1968 to promote judicial
efficiency.74 As litigation became increasingly complicated in the
mid-twentieth century, MDL proceedings were created to centralize
and consolidate discovery and pre-trial motions.75 When multiple
similar civil claims have been filed in different federal district courts,
a panel of federal judges called the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) can transfer civil actions with similar questions of
fact to a single district court that it assigns to hear consolidated pretrial
proceedings.76 The parties to the litigation need not consent in order
for their case to be transferred and in fact are frequently opposed to
transfer.77
Essentially, MDL transferee courts preside over everything but
the trial itself.78 When an individual case is ready for trial, it is
remanded back to the original court in which it was filed.79 MDLs
mitigate the risk of inconsistent rulings between different courts on
similar pre-trial issues and save parties time and costs during
discovery.80 Typical MDL cases include employment practices,
securities fraud, and quintessentially, medical device, drug, and
products liability claims.81
The vast majority of cases against opioid defendants have been
consolidated by the JPML in the Northern District of Ohio before
Judge Dan A. Polster.82 Five hundred thirty-nine California counties
and cities and at least three sovereign California Indian tribes have

73. Id.; Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 2084, at 3–4 (J.P.M.L.
Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter JPML Transfer Order].
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
75. Overview of Panel, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(h); see, e.g., Motion to Remand at 3–4, South Carolina v. McKesson
Corp., No. 3:19-cv-02783-BHH (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2019), ECF No. 7.
78. Kathleen Michon, Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) for Drug Lawsuits and Other Cases,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-drug-lawsuits32952.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
79. Id.
80. JPML Transfer Order, supra note 73, at 3–4; Overview of Panel, supra note 75.
81. Michon, supra note 78.
82. JPML Transfer Order, supra note 73, at 4.
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pending actions in the Opioid MDL court.83 In order to avoid
consolidation in the Opioid MDL, most states, including California,
have purposefully kept their cases in state court by only alleging state
law claims.84 Of the test cases discussed in this Note, Mariposa County
and the City of Los Angeles are consolidated in the Opioid MDL, and
California is pursuing its claims alone in California state courts.85 All
three cases were filed after the creation of the Opioid MDL in 2017,
and both Mariposa and Los Angeles included federal claims in their
original pleadings likely knowing that they would be immediately
transferred to the Opioid MDL court.86
In addition to being a tool for aggregation and faster resolution of
pre-trial issues, MDLs frequently produce broadly binding
settlements.87 To that end, it is clear that the goal of Judge Polster’s
court and the Opioid MDL proceedings is settlement. At an early
hearing on the matter, Judge Polster said, “my objective is to do
something meaningful to abate this crisis. . . . [W]e don’t need a lot of
briefs and we don’t need trials. . . . [N]one of those are going to solve
what we’ve got.”88 MDLs attempt to achieve “global peace” or a
settlement that uses claim preclusion to close all present and future
litigation between the parties.89
Though the Opioid MDL has been ongoing since 2017, a global
settlement has still not been reached. Judge Polster has tried many
tactics to encourage settlement.90 Some of them, like the negotiation

83. Posses, supra note 34; Del Real, supra note 3; Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra
note 34.
84. Dwyer, supra note 32. See generally Complaint at 50–53, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. 19STCV19045 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 2019) [hereinafter State of California Complaint].
85. See State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 1; City of Los Angeles Complaint,
supra note 28, at 1; County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 1.
86. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 1; County of Mariposa Complaint, supra
note 29, at 1.
87. See Guide, Ten Steps to Better Case Management: A Guide for Multidistrict Litigation
Transferee Judges, U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig. & Fed. Jud. Ctr. 9 (2014),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Judges-2D.pdf; McCollum, supra
note 36, at 949–53; Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275,
2277–79 (2017).
88. Gluck et al., supra note 63, at 17.
89. McCollum, supra note 36, at 942.
90. See Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Schedules 2019 Trial in Opioid Litigation, REUTERS
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-idINKBN1HI3EI.
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class described below, are novel and being used for the first time
ever.91 Others, like bellwether trials, are frequently used in MDLs.92
b. City and County of San Francisco bellwether
Alternatively referred to as “test cases,” bellwethers are
individual trials that test how different claims and defenses will fair at
trial.93 The goal of a bellwether is to produce reliable information
about how similar cases centralized in the same MDL proceeding are
likely to play out so that those remaining parties in the MDL may
decide if they wish to continue to their own trials or settle.94 After an
initial set of bellwethers settled on the eve of trial in October 2019,95
the court remanded three additional bellwethers to their original
transferor district courts, to be tried simultaneously.96 City of Chicago
v. Purdue Pharma L.P. will address claims against manufacturer
defendants.97 Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp. is aimed at
resolving the unique issues in cases brought by sovereign Indian
tribes.98 City and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
names both manufacturers and distributors as defendants and is almost
done with the discovery phase.99
With California cities, counties, and sovereign tribes counting for
over one-fifth of all plaintiffs in the Opioid MDL, City of San
Francisco could be the most informative bellwether for all California
plaintiffs.

91. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP, at 2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter N.D. Ohio Memorandum
Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class].
92. Zimmerman, supra note 87, at 2276–77. Though two bellwether trials were initially
scheduled for October 2019, they settled on the eve of trial.
93. Raymond, supra note 90.
94. Guide, Bellwether Trials in MDL Proceedings: A Guide for Transferee Judges, Melissa J.
Whitney, Fed. Jud. Ctr. & U.S.
Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig. 3–4 (2019),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/19/Bellwether%20Trials%20in%20MDL%20Pro
ceedings.pdf.
95. The parties settled for about $300 million. Sara Randazzo & Patrick Fitzgerald, Novel Plan
Aims to Settle Opioid Suits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2019,
5:33
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-look-to-use-purdue-pharmas-bankruptcy-tosettle-opioid-suits-11569877871; Dwyer, supra note 32.
96. Suggestions of Remand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP,
at 1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/sites/ohnd/files/2941.pdf.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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San Francisco alleges public nuisance, unfair competition, false
advertising, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) violation, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
fraudulent concealment against Purdue Pharma, individual members
of the Purdue family, the Purdue Family Trust, and several other
manufacturers and distributors.100 San Francisco does not make claims
against any pharmacies.101 San Francisco seeks costs, attorney’s fees,
civil penalties, restitution, disgorgement of unjust enrichment,
exemplary damages, punitive damages, and treble damages under
RICO.102 All of the test cases examined in this Note share multiple
claims with City of San Francisco. It will also be any California
plaintiff’s first opportunity to litigate any issues of home rule, or which
government entities “own” which claims when local governments and
the state both seek to make the same claim, on behalf of the same
citizens, on the same facts. In this case, California’s public nuisance
statute is claimed by all plaintiffs.103 While the results of City of San
Francisco will not be binding on other California plaintiffs, it should
give an accurate picture of how similar claims are likely to play out in
their own trials and may even promote settlement. As Table 1
demonstrates, many California plaintiffs share similar claims.

100. Complaint at 1–2, City and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:18-cv7591 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018), ECF No. 1.
101. Id. (a complaint that does not have claims against pharmacies).
102. Id. at 158–59.
103. Id. at 1.

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/19/21 2:46 PM

Table 1. Comparison of Claims Between California Plaintiffs*

Statutory Public
Nuisance
RICO
Negligence
Unjust
Enrichment
Negligent
Misrepresentation
Fraud
Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
Untrue or
Misleading
Representations
(Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code
§ 17500)
Unfair
Competition Law
(Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code
§ 17200)
*

City and
County of
San
Francisco

Mariposa
County

City of Los
Angeles

California

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X indicates that the plaintiff makes this claim in its complaint.

c. Negotiation class
The Opioid MDL created a new tool in class action practice: the
negotiation class.104 In a typical class action, putative class members

104. N.D. Ohio Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 91, at 3; see
also Deborah Hensler, Opioid Negotiation Class May Be Organic Procedure Evolution, LAW360
(Sept. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1204097/opioid-negotiation-classmay-be-organic-procedure-evolution (discussing Judge Polster being the first judge to adopt the
negotiation class); Order Certifying Review of Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 19-0306, at 1–2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter 6th Cir. Order Certifying Review
of Negotiation Class]. Note, the negotiation class is currently under review with the Sixth Circuit.
See generally Appeals Court Grants Review of Opioid ‘Negotiation’ Class Opposed by
Delaware, Others, DEL. L.
WKLY. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/3b15ecd3-f77c-43c4-a1d6d4a01c46daee/?context=1530671.

292

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/19/21 2:46 PM

LITIGATING AN OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN CALIFORNIA

293

may opt in or out of a settlement after terms are reached.105 However,
in the negotiation class, plaintiffs opt in or out of the class before
settlement negotiations begin. The mechanism provides defendants
with more security during negotiations knowing that individual class
members will not opt out later if they do not like the terms. A final
settlement will require approval by 75 percent of the class members in
five different votes: 75 percent each by allocation, by population, by
number, by plaintiffs who have begun litigating, and by plaintiffs who
have not begun litigating, plus “approval from six separate
supermajority vote counts, reflecting different slices of the class,”106
and the court will still have to approve the settlement under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e) and 23(h).107
The negotiation class is comprised of all county and city
governments involved in the MDL.108 It explicitly excludes Native
American tribal governments and payors, and implicitly excludes
states.109 The negotiation class preserves the rights of class members
to pursue their own claims in other fora outside of the MDL until a
settlement is approved.110 The negotiation class will remain active for
five years—in other words, the parties will have until 2024 to come to
terms.111
As the negotiation class is an expansion of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, the Sixth Circuit has granted interlocutory review of
Judge Polster’s order certifying the class.112 The novel nature of the
negotiation class potentially puts any settlements reached between
defendants and the class at risk. If the Sixth Circuit finds the
negotiation class an impermissible expansion of Rule 23, then any
settlements reached may be unraveled. A number of plaintiffs,
105. The Special Master overseeing the Opioid MDL settlement negotiations, Professor Francis
McGovern along with Professor William B. Rubenstein pioneered the idea of creating a
“Negotiation Class.” Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A
Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403834.#.
106. N.D. Ohio Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 91, at 3.
107. See FAQ, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG., supra note 5 (see answer to
question 19).
108. Other political subdivisions are also included, “[a]ll counties, parishes, and boroughs
(collectively, ‘counties’); and all incorporated places, including without limitation cities, towns,
townships, villages, and municipalities (collectively, ‘cities’).” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 6th Cir. Order Certifying Review of Negotiation Class, supra note 104, at 2.
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defendants, and amici argued against the negotiation class before the
Sixth Circuit.113 In addition, twenty-six state attorney generals led by
Texas’ Ken Paxton and California’s Xavier Becerra oppose the
creation of the negotiation class, stating, “Plaintiffs’ novel and
untested approach . . . . [,] the approval of a novel ‘[N]egotiation
[C]lass’ at this stage[,] will invite legal challenges to any eventual
settlement, adding uncertainty and making it more difficult for the
parties to a achieve a global resolution.”114
The negotiation class creates a block of plaintiffs (some cities and
counties are not even members, yet would still be bound by a global
settlement agreement) with the greatest negotiation leverage. This
makes other plaintiffs, especially state attorneys general who are used
to calling their own shots, uncomfortable. These are not the only
points of contention between local and state government plaintiffs.
d. Disagreements between local and state plaintiffs
In recent settlement negotiations, fractures developed between
states and local governments.115 The Attorneys General, politically
elected or appointed, may have the political incentive and the financial
resources of their state’s respective departments of justice to be
flexible and hold out for settlement offers in a way that many local
governments cannot. In response to a settlement offer from Purdue,
the Pennsylvania Attorney General called the company’s owners, the
Sackler family, “‘sanctimonious billionaires’ with ‘blood on their
hands.’”116 Accordingly, cities and counties appear wary of deferring
to attorneys general. Another problem is the fact that local and state
governments seek to assert the same claims, under the same statutes,
on the same facts, and may not both be able to recover. Adding to the
confusion is each state’s unique case law regarding home rule and
113. Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) at 1,
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 19-305 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019); Joint Petition for
Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 19-305 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2019), ECF No. 1-2.
114. Letter, Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Certification of Rule 23(b)(3)
Cities/Counties Negotiation Class, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804,
from Ken Paxton, State of Tex., Off. of Att’y Gen., Xavier Becerra, State of Cal., Off of Att’y Gen.,
to Judge Polster (June 24, 2019).
115. Alaina Lancaster, Why NJ Didn’t Join the Settlement with Purdue Pharma, LAW.COM
(Sept. 12, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2019/09/12/why-cities-andcounties-settled-with-purdue-while-some-states-wouldnt-touch-it-399-31661/.
116. Id.
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ambiguous statutory language as to whether local governments may
bring claims on behalf of all people in the state. When Ohio attempted
to pass legislation consolidating the state’s one hundred or so local
government cases under the Attorney General’s office, Akron mayor
Dan Horrigan wrote, “[t]o suggest, at the 11th hour, that the state
should control and keep the hard-fought compensation our community
and first responders deserve is offensive . . . . It’s clear who is grasping
for power (and money) in this situation.”117
e. Purdue’s bankruptcy: defendants seek to control settlement
Plaintiffs are not the only ones attempting to control settlement
on their own terms.118 Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the most frequently
named and maligned defendant, recently entered bankruptcy
proceedings in the Southern District of New York.119 Because
Purdue’s assets will be severely restricted, bankruptcy has
significantly increased Purdue’s leverage in settlement negotiations.
Further complicating settlement negotiations is the uncertain
valuation of Purdue’s assets and plaintiffs’ choice to name or not name
the Sackler family individually as defendants in order to access their
personal assets in trial or settlement.120 Bankruptcy court documents
estimate that the Sackler family personally profited $13 billion from
Purdue, and before declaring bankruptcy, transferred $1 billion into
offshore personal accounts.121
The early outlines of a settlement agreement between Purdue and
twenty-nine U.S. territories and states began to take shape in 2019.
The proposed settlement would transfer all of Purdue’s assets into a
trust and restructure the business into a new company that is
117. Robin Goist, Summit County Executive, Akron Mayor Condemn Proposed State Takeover
of Lawsuits Against Opioid Makers, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.cleveland.co
m/open/2019/08/summit-county-executive-akron-mayor-condemn-proposed-state-takeover-oflawsuits-against-opioid-makers.html.
118. See McCollum, supra note 36, at 953–54, 969–71.
119. See Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 5, No. 19-23649-rdd
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y Sept. 15, 2019).
120. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purduepharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html (updated Sept. 17, 2019).
121. Christopher Rowland, Sackler Family Transferred $1.36 Billion in Purdue Pharma
Profits Overseas, Company Says in Court Filing, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sackler-family-transferred-136-billion-inpurdue-pharma-profits-overseas-company-says-in-court-filing/2019/12/16/b4ecb3d2-205d-11ea86f3-3b5019d451db_story.html.
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permanently enjoined from marketing opioids.122 The new company
would also donate overdose reversal and addiction treatment
medications to communities in need.123 Moreover, the Sackler family
would relinquish ownership of Purdue and contribute at least $3
billion of their own money to the $10 to $12 billion settlement.124 The
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York will
administer the settlement during Purdue’s Chapter 11 proceedings.
Most compelling of all, five other manufacturer defendants Endo
International, Johnson & Johnson, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,
Allergan, and Mallinckrodt seek to join Purdue’s bankruptcy
proceedings through a global settlement agreement.125 The other
drugmakers would contribute to the settlement’s trust in exchange for
settlement and a so-called third-party release of claims—a form of
settlement only available in some jurisdictions like New York.126
Besides carrying heavy debts as a result of litigation, defendants
like Purdue are also facing challenges from their litigation insurers.127
As local, state, and federal governments begin to receive judgments
against manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, defendants’ litigation insurers are questioning
whether their coverage extends to cover a public health crisis.128
Health insurance companies are also suing manufacturers for
insurance fraud.129 For example, Athena is suing bankrupt opioid
manufacturer Insys, claiming “that the rapid increase in Insys’s sales
was due to a two-pronged scheme in which Insys encouraged
physicians to overprescribe . . . and defrauded insurers into providing
coverage for the off-label prescriptions.”130
Not all states are buying into Purdue’s bankruptcy-driven
settlement offer. Some attorneys general draw issue with the fact that
122. Id.; Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120.
123. Rowland, supra note 121; Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120.
124. Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120.
125. Randazzo & Fitzgerald, supra note 95.
126. Id.
127. Raymond Tittmann et al., 5 Insurance Coverage Questions Raised by Opioid Litigation,
LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185428/5-insurancecoverage-questions-raised-by-opioid-litigation; Michael Levesque et al., Research Announcement:
Moody’s—More Opioid Settlements Likely in 2020, with Mainly Negative Credit Impact for
Defendants, MOODY’S (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-More-opioidsettlements-likely-in-2020-with-mainly-negative--PBC_1218393.
128. Tittmann et al., supra note 127.
129. See Aetna Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 541, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
130. Id. at 548.
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the Sackler family will not personally be forced to disgorge any of
their profits.131 The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States is a
group opposed to a bankruptcy settlement and includes California,
twenty-three other states, and D.C.132 While state court cases against
Purdue are stayed during Purdue’s bankruptcy, until a majority of
states with active suits consent, there will be no settlement.133
2. California Plaintiffs: A Fight on Many Fronts
This Note compares the claims lodged by Mariposa County in
northern California, the City of Los Angeles, and the State of
California. Local governments pleaded broadly and are pursuing
claims in federal court in the MDL, where the state’s case is narrowly
pleaded against a single manufacturer and remains in state superior
court.
a. Mariposa County
Mariposa County (“Mariposa” or “the County”) is home to just
under 18,000 Californians,134 portions of Yosemite National Park, and
14,441 active prescriptions for opioids—roughly 0.85 per resident.135
Mariposa is a named member of the Opioid MDL negotiation class
and has also joined other local plaintiffs in the California Opioid
Consortium, a group mostly made up of other California local
governments represented by the same plaintiff’s firm.136 Mariposa
131. Nathaniel Weixel, Holdouts Vow to Challenge Purdue Pharma Settlement, THE HILL
(Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/461664-holdouts-vow-to-challenge-purdue-pharmasettlement. New York alleges that it discovered $1 billion of wire transfers from Purdue to Sackler
family Swiss bank accounts just two days before the bankruptcy was announced. Id.
132. Id.; Christopher Rowland, OxyContin Settlement Snag: Arizona Objects to Stay of
Litigation Against Purdue Pharma and Sacklers, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/oxycontin-settlement-snag-arizona-objectsto-stay-of-litigation-against-purdue-pharma-and-sacklers/2019/10/08/88105058-e9da-11e9-85c085a098e47b37_story.html.
133. See Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Orders Pause in Opioid Litigation Against Purdue
Pharma and Sacklers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/health/
purdue-bankruptcy-opioids.html.
134. QuickFacts: Mariposa County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
135. California Opioid Dashboard, supra note 1 (click “County Dashboards”; then choose
“Mariposa” from “Select County to view Dashboard” dropdown).
136. Brandi Cummings, 30 California Counties Sue Drugmakers for Opioid Crisis, KCRA
(May 10, 2018, 12:05 AM), https://www.kcra.com/article/30-california-counties-sue-drugmakersfor-opioid-crisis/20640984; Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra note 34 (click “Cities and
Counties” hyperlink).

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

298

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/19/21 2:46 PM

[Vol. 54:275

alleges 1) two claims for public nuisance;137 2) two claims under
RICO;138 3) false advertising;139 4) negligent misrepresentation;140 5)
fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation;141 and 6) unjust enrichment.142
Mariposa seeks punitive damages under common law and California
Civil Code section 3294.143 It also seeks abatement of the public
nuisance, enjoinder from creating further nuisance, declaratory relief
stating that defendants were in violation of the California False
Advertising Act, enjoinder from further false advertising, restitution,
actual damages, compensation for the costs of the epidemic, and civil
penalties of $2,500 per each incident of false advertising, and
attorney’s fees and costs.144
The relief sought by Mariposa is by far the most broad-based.
Mariposa seeks to “recover the costs of prevention efforts, treatment
and services, as well as costs associated with jailing residents addicted
to prescription painkillers and heroin.”145 Mariposa alleges it was
harmed by being required to repair and retrofit “property related to
police, emergency, health, prosecution, corrections and other
services” and other governmental costs.146 It also alleges “specific and
special injuries because its damages include, inter alia, injury to the
property and systems of its health services, law enforcement, and
medical examiner, as well as property costs related to opioid addiction
treatment and overdose prevention.”147 The County seeks
reimbursement for infrastructure costs related to increasing the
number of jail beds, retrofitting and upgrading court, jail, medical
137. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 121.
138. Id. at 135, 251.
139. Id. at 299 (in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500).
140. Id. at 302.
141. Id. at 306.
142. Id. at 308.
143. Id. at 311.
144. Mariposa lists such costs as: medical care and addiction care, treatment counseling and
rehabilitation services, costs for “treatment of infants born with opioid-related medical conditions;
. . . care for children whose parents suffer from opioid-related disability or incapacitation; and . . .
costs associated with law enforcement and public safety relating to the opioid epidemic.” Id. at
311–13.
145. Letter, Resolution Authorizing Participation in the California Counties Opioid Consortium
and Approving Agts, from Steve Dahlem, Cnty. Couns. Interim Hum. Res. Dir., to Bd. of
Supervisors 1 (May 1, 2018), https://www.mariposacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/66935/Res
olution_2018-192?bidId= [hereinafter Letter Authorizing Participation in the California Opioid
Consortium].
146. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 135.
147. Id.
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examiner, hospital, and treatment facilities.148 It alleges causation
through the defendants’ awareness of the likelihood of diversion and
their failure to control it.149 Mariposa alleges public nuisance both on
behalf of the County and, per the language of the statute, on behalf of
all Californians.150
Mariposa alleges with excellent specificity damages caused by
the diversion of opioids. The complaint quantifies and details
increases in pharmacy robberies, neonatal abstinence syndrome,
fentanyl seizures, and ultimately opioid-related deaths.151 Mariposa
also does an excellent job of pleading facts specific to their County,
including opioid-related deaths, the increased rate of emergency
department visits for opioid-overdoses, and the county-specific rate of
opioid misuse and disorder.152
When it comes to the problem of causation, Mariposa
acknowledges a slightly more attenuated chain, but is able to draw a
straight line between the defendants’ actions and damages to the
county, stating, “Although not as direct as a car accident or a slip-andfall case, this causal chain is still a ‘direct sequence’ and a logical,
substantial and foreseeable cause of the County’s injury.”153 Mariposa
is represented by the county’s counsel and four plaintiffs’ firms, all of
whom are representing other cities and counties in the Opioid MDL.154
Mariposa’s complaint has the benefit of the plaintiffs’ firm’s expertise
and no up-front costs to the county or tax payers. The claims here are
pleaded specifically, tracking the claims of other Opioid MDL
plaintiffs, yet take advantage of pertinent state law and specific
damages to Mariposa.

148. Id. at 132.
149. Id. at 127–28.
150. Id. at 127–30.
151. Id. at 292–94, 296–98.
152. Id. at 294–95.
153. Id. at 296.
154. They refer to themselves as a “National Consortium” of plaintiff’s attorneys working on
similar MDL claims. See Letter Authorizing Participation in the California Opioid Consortium,
supra note 145 at 2.

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

300

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/19/21 2:46 PM

[Vol. 54:275

a. City of Los Angeles
The City of Los Angeles (“the City”) alleges four claims: 1)
public nuisance,155 2) RICO violations,156 3) negligence,157 and 4)
negligent misrepresentation.158 The City of Los Angeles is a member
of the negotiation class.159 Initially, the City did not make any claims
against the Sackler family individually nor pharmacies, but the City
filed a supplemental amendment in March 2019 and now names a total
of thirty defendants.160 In a press release announcing the suit, the City
Attorney said,
“The scourge of prescription drug addiction has made a
significant impact on Los Angeles residents and created a
continued public nuisance in our City” . . . . “Manufacturers
and distributors of these highly addictive and potentially fatal
drugs must be held accountable for driving the opioid
epidemic and the significant impacts of their reckless and
irresponsible business practices.”161
The City seeks injunctions against defendants for
maintaining the public nuisance, failing to report suspicious
orders, “further false marketing and require[s] they take
affirmative action to ameliorate the effects of their prior false
marketing.”162
The City is represented by the City Attorney and a San Francisco
securities fraud and complex litigation firm.163 It is the only California
plaintiff examined here that alleges negligence, and it does so based
on both common law and statutory duties to comply with the
California unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising statute, and
155. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 145; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480
(Deering 2020); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (Deering 2020).
156. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 146.
157. Id. at 157.
158. Id. at 159.
159. Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra note 34.
160. Short Form for Supplementing Complaint and Amending Defendants and Jury Demand at
1, In Re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-op-45601-DAP (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2019), ECF
No. 24 [hereinafter Short Form for Supplementing City of Los Angeles Complaint].
161. City Attorney Mike Feuer Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers, Distributors, L.A.
CITY ATT’Y MIKE FEUER (May 3, 2018), https://www.lacityattorney.org/post/2018/05/03/cityattorney-mike-feuer-files-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturersdistributors?preview=true&site_id=312 (updated Nov. 13, 2018).
162. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 160.
163. Id. at 1; Consumer Cases, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP,
https://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases-consumer.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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the California Health and Safety Code, as well as a duty to comply
with the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law that regulates,
among other things, how high-risk pharmaceuticals are distributed.164
Equitable relief predominates the City’s prayer for relief, but it also
seeks restitution, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, exemplary, and
punitive damages. Probably due to the fact that most public health data
on the issue are more accessible at the county level, the City alleges
specific facts related to Los Angeles County damages but not the
impact of opioids on the City of Los Angeles.165 The only city-specific
factual allegation is at least the most important metric: opioid-related
death rates until 2015 averaged 2.5 per one hundred thousand persons,
and 9.0 per one hundred thousand emergency room visits Angelenos
were admitted to hospitals for an opioid overdose at about the same
rate.166 The City’s theory of causation for public nuisance, RICO, and
negligence rests on failure to report suspicious orders, whereas the
negligent misrepresentation claim rests on causation by the affirmative
concealment and omission of the risk of addiction.167
The City’s pleadings represent a comprehensive effort to plead
broadly against many kinds of defendants and to benefit from sharing
and incorporating complicated claims like RICO along with other
plaintiffs,168 while testing out lesser pleaded theories like negligence.
c. California State
On June 3, 2019, California filed a complaint in Los Angeles
County Superior Court against Purdue and the Sackler family alleging
violations of: 1) California’s public nuisance statute,169 2) untrue or
misleading representations,170 and the UCL.171 The State seeks
permanent injunctions from false advertising and abatement of the
public nuisance, civil penalties for each violation of the false

164. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 158.
165. Id. at 5–7.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Id. at 159.
168. Short Form for Supplementing City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 160, at 1–8.
169. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 52; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480
(Deering 2020).
170. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 50; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500
(Deering 2020).
171. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 51; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
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advertising law and the UCL, and other equitable relief.172 California
seeks, above all else, to hold the Sacklers accountable and to make an
example of them.173
California attempts to “take[] charge of any public nuisance,
unfair competition law, and false advertising law claims brought on
behalf of the People concerning the matters described herein.”174
Seeking a friendlier jury at home and to maintain control of its own
claims, the state has purposefully kept its claims out of the MDL and
in state court.175 In a press conference announcing the lawsuit,
Attorney General Xavier Becerra said,
[T]he start of this crisis can be traced back to . . . Purdue
Pharma and the Sackler family . . . . Purdue and the Sacklers
traded the health and well-being of Californians for profit
and created an unprecedented national public health crisis in
the process, but we will hold them accountable.176
The goals of the State seem to be just that, holding Purdue alone,
and no other manufacturer, distributor, or pharmacy, accountable.
About three weeks after California filed its complaint, Purdue
filed for bankruptcy and the State subsequently amended its complaint
to include eight other members of the Sackler family.177
Confoundingly, the State does not allege claims against any other
opioid manufacturers, distributors, or pharmacies—not even against
defendants like distributor McKesson, California’s second-largest
company after only Apple.178 Since 2017, McKesson has distributed
more hydrocodone and oxycodone in California than any other
172. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 54–55; Patrick McGreevy, California
Joins Opioid Fight, Sues Purdue Pharma over Marketing of OxyContin, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2019,
11:41 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-oxycontin-maker-sued-by-california20190603-story.html.
173. Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Sues Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma for
Its Illegal Practices and Role in the Opioid Crisis, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Xavier Becerra, Att’y
Gen. (June 3, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-sues-opioidmanufacturer-purdue-pharma-its-illegal [hereinafter Becerra Press Release].
174. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 4–5.
175. Id. at 1.
176. ABC10, Xavier Becerra Announces Lawsuit Against Maker of Oxycontin at Opioid
Summit, YOUTUBE (June 3, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lzeu6m9sDZc.
177. First Amended Complaint at 1, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19STCV19045 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter State of California First Amended Complaint]; Becerra Press
Release, supra note 173.
178. Joe Mathews, It’s California’s Second Richest Company, but You Probably Haven’t
Heard of It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/califo
rnia-forum/article194175574.html.
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company.179 McKesson also generated $214 billion in revenue in
2019, up 3 percent from the year prior—roughly $4 billion from opioid
distribution alone.180 Further, McKesson is under investigation by the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for non-compliance with a
2017 settlement with the Justice Department over alleged diversion of
opioids in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.181 The
settlement requires McKesson to report suspicious orders to the
DEA.182 It is alleged that it failed to do so.183
The State attempts to preempt state statutory violations from
cities and counties in their own cases against Purdue. California
appears to be experiencing a similar internal disagreement as other
states over which claims can be alleged by local governments and
which claims the state “owns.” Though less public than Ohio’s
dispute, California attempts to assert control over all pending UCL and
false advertising statutory claims against Purdue. As discussed below,
case law does not support this exertion of power.
i. Home rule
In its first amended complaint in People v. Purdue Pharma, the
state wrote:
Pursuant to his constitutional and statutory authority as chief
law officer, including his responsibility to ensure that the
laws are uniformly and adequately enforced, his supervision
over District Attorneys and other law enforcement officers,
and his authority to take charge of any investigation or
prosecution over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction,
the Attorney General, through the filing of this action, takes
charge of any public nuisance, unfair competition law, and
false advertising law claims brought on behalf of the People
179. Id.
180. Brian Alexander, When a Company Is Making Money from the Opioid Crisis, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/09/opioid-crisisresponsibility-profits/538938/; McKesson Reports Fiscal 2019 Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year
Results, MCKESSON (May 8, 2019), https://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/
press-releases/2019/mckesson-reports-fiscal-2019-fourth-quarter-results/.
181. Stanton, supra note 67.
182. Id. McKesson did not donate to Becerra’s campaign for Attorney General,
AmerisourceBergen, however, did. Rep. Xavier Becerra—California District 34: Political Action
Committees (PACs) 2015–2016, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/members-ofcongress/pacs?cat=H04&catlong=Pharmaceuticals%2FHealth+Products&cid=N00009774&cycle
=2016&seclong=Health&sector=H (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
183. Stanton, supra note 67.
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concerning the matters described herein. This is the People’s
operative complaint, and the people’s [sic] operative action,
concerning those claims and matters.184
While it is important to note that “those claims and matters” refer
only to claims made against Purdue and the Sacklers and no other
defendant, this has been the only sign of a home rule conflict between
the state and the local governments. Even though California is
attempting to assert control over claims made under the public
nuisance statute, city attorneys, county counsel, and district attorneys
have “concurrent” rights to bring public nuisance claims in the name
of the people of the State of California.185 The statute actually says
nothing about the Attorney General.186 Under a strict reading of the
statute, the concurrent claims of Mariposa, the City of Los Angeles,
and the State of California in theory can stand separately from one
another, meaning that they may be able to recover independently.
Recovery on a successful claim of public nuisance includes abatement
and past damages.187
The California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the California
Constitution’s home rule provisions protects Mariposa and Los
Angeles’s right to litigate such claims on their own behalves.188 It is
still unclear whether both the Attorney General and a political
subdivision may bring simultaneous claims on behalf of the People of
California. Absent an express statutory provision, state preemption of
these claims is unlikely: the statutes provide no express preemption
language,189 and the state constitution has been construed broadly to
give deference to cities and counties. “It has long been settled that,
insofar as a charter city legislates with regard to municipal affairs, its
charter prevails over general state law. . . . However, as to matters of
statewide concern, charter cities remain subject to state law. . . .
Similar rules apply to charter counties.”190 In fact, California’s public
nuisance statutes seem to expressly permit local governments to
184. State of California First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 5–6.
185. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (Deering 2020).
186. See id.
187. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3484 (Deering 2020).
188. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4–5.
189. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (Deering 2020). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §
3494; Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 21 (Cal. 2010) (in which several cities and
counties brought public nuisance action against manufacturers of lead paint).
190. Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1979) (in
bank).
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pursue them on behalf of the state.191 When a similar issue arose in
2014 when Orange and Santa Clara Counties brought UCL and false
advertising claims against Purdue, Purdue removed to federal court
but the district court remanded finding that because the action was
brought on behalf of the People of the State of California (per the
statute’s express authorization), no diversity existed.192
Complicating matters further is the broad pleading of local
governments like Los Angeles and Mariposa to include multiple
defendants as opposed to California’s narrowly pleaded case against
Purdue and the Sacklers alone.193 Purdue and the Sacklers are included
in Los Angeles and Mariposa’s complaints, with both alleging public
nuisance on behalf of their local communities and all Californians.194
Additionally, Mariposa alleges violation of the California false
advertising statute.195 The State’s attempt to co-opt those claims is
likely to be unsuccessful, or at the very least, not worth the time to
litigate.
ii. The State’s claims
The State’s claims are the most narrowly pleaded of any
California plaintiff. California alleges only three causes of action
against Purdue and its owners. No common law causes of action are
alleged, only statutory claims.
While the State pleaded with great detail as to the general
wrongdoing of Purdue and the Sacklers, it only alleged few facts
specific to defendants’ impact on California.196 Establishing damages
specific to California, and more critically, linking causation to those
damages may prove difficult.
191. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 26528 (Deering 2020) provides, “The district attorney may, and
when directed by the board of supervisors shall, bring a civil action in the name of the people of
the State of California to abate a public nuisance in his county.”
192. California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. SACV 14-1080-JSL (DFMx), 2014 WL 6065907,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014) (“Here, the FAC shows the Plaintiff is the People of the State of
California. A state is not a citizen of itself and thus cannot be party to a diversity action. Fifty
Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1970.) Therefore, looking to the face
of the complaint, diversity jurisdiction does not appear to exist in this matter.”).
193. See City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28. But see State of California Complaint,
supra note 84.
194. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 121; City of Los Angeles Complaint,
supra note 28, at 145.
195. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 299.
196. See State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 46–48 (facts related to Purdue’s
California sales force and donations to California organizations supposedly friendly to opioids).
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This narrative-heavy, but generalized form of pleading, combined
with the State’s choice to only pursue claims against the single most
notorious defendant in the opioid litigation may suggest that the State
is more interested in the publicity associated with a high-profile trial
than in seeking reimbursement of damages and abatement of the crisis.
It is equally possible that the State would pursue this strategy to avoid
recovering a judgment out from under its cities and counties or work
behind the scenes to broker a global settlement. However, it seems that
the State may not be factually equipped to handle trial on these claims
and should aggressively seek settlement in Purdue’s bankruptcy
proceedings.
A look at the actual costs associated with the opioid epidemic in
California provides the scale that a settlement or judgment would have
to reach to effectively reimburse governments for damages. In 2018,
the California State Treasurer’s Office estimated the total cost of the
epidemic to the State at $4.3 billion.197 One study estimates that the
cost of a single inpatient hospital stay related to opioid misuse is
$6,671.198 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
calculates that 19.5 percent of California’s state budget is spent coping
with substance use and addiction, though only 2 percent of that is used
for addiction treatment and recovery.199 Though the overall death toll
from opioids in California is lower than other parts of the country, the
economic cost is higher than any other state.200 Considering Purdue’s
bankruptcy, it is unlikely that California will be able to recover all of
its costs against Purdue alone.
Moreover, the UCL earmarks how civil penalties from a
judgment are used. The statute provides,
If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of
the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the
county in which the judgment was entered, and one-half to
197. Hale & DiSalvo, supra note 2.
198. Peter J. Mallow et al., Geographic Variation in Hospital Costs, Payments, and Length of
Stay for Opioid-Related Hospital Visits in the USA, 11 J. PAIN RSCH. 3079, 3083–85 (2018).
199. Hale & DiSalvo, supra note 2. Plaintiffs are in the odd position that the more they spent
on treatment and services, the better the case they have to prove damages. Poorer counties and cities
who did not have the money to begin with might be at a disadvantage.
200. Id. California tops the list of opioid related expenditures by a landslide; the closest state is
Texas, $2 billion behind. See also THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 3–9 (2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost
%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf (attempting to quantify costs to the federal government).
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the General Fund. . . . The aforementioned funds shall be for
the exclusive use by the Attorney General, the district
attorney, the county counsel, and the city attorney for the
enforcement of consumer protection laws.201
Likewise, the false advertising statute earmarks civil penalties as
one-half to the state and one-half to the county where the action was
brought.202 Because of this predetermined statutory earmark, no
judgment recovered under this statute could be used to reimburse the
State for healthcare costs associated with the opioid epidemic, start
new addiction recovery programs, or fund any other public health
use.203
Clearly, the opioid epidemic begs several questions of the
American legal system. These questions bring into focus the
limitations of the courts when it comes to class action, which local
governments can sue on behalf of their citizens, and the meaning and
scope of corporate accountability. Ultimately, only one question
matters to the tens of thousands of people suffering from addiction or
its second-hand consequences: can litigation provide relief? If so, what
kind and if not, why bother?
California cannot solve its opioid problem with litigation alone.
But litigation can provide a path toward the best public health strategy
local governments and states have: prevention. By seeking both
remuneration for government funds spent fighting the opioid crisis and
funds to abate the crisis, governments at all levels can create and fund
long-term public health strategies that fit the unique needs of their
individual communities. However, as past public health litigation
demonstrates, these funds must be proactively protected from
expenditure or reappropriation to non-public health expenditures
through legislation, settlement terms, or ballot measures.
C. Past Public Health Litigation: Lessons from Big Tobacco
While the opioid litigation stands to be the most impactful public
health litigation ever, it is not the first of its kind. The most prominent
and successful example of public health litigation to date is the state201. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (Deering 2020).
202. See id. § 17536(c). “If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the
penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered,
and one-half to the State Treasurer.” Id.
203. Id.
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driven suits against tobacco companies for smoking-related harms in
the 1990s. In that case, the parties agreed to a twenty-five-year $246
billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that ended the decadeslong litigation.204 Most importantly, the MSA is a landmark not just
for its size and scope, but because it was crafted with public health in
mind.205
1. Tobacco Litigation Background
Litigation against tobacco companies began in the 1950s.206
These cases, usually brought by individuals, failed for forty-five
years.207 Then, in the 1990s, the tide began to turn.208 By sharing
resources and strategies from the few plaintiff victories through
plaintiffs-only conferences and associations like the Tobacco Trial
Lawyers Association, the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository,
and the Tobacco Control Resource Center at Northeastern University
School of Law, plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to replicate and multiply
the success of those early victories on a larger scale.209 State attorneys
general led by Mike Moore of Mississippi quickly followed, and by
1998 D.C., five U.S. Territories, and forty-six states, including
California, had filed suit.210
2. California Plaintiffs in the Tobacco Litigation
California, now a state that heavily regulates tobacco and has one
of the highest tobacco sales taxes ($2.87 per pack), did not join the
204. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF MASTER
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 8 (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231942.pdf
[hereinafter STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS]; Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid
Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG
(May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/; W.E.
Parmet & R.A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437
(2000).
205. THE TOBACCO CONTROL RES. CTR., INC., AT NE. U. SCH. OF L., THE MULTISTATE
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL
17–18 (1999).
206. Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History & Recent Developments, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-development32202.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
207. Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco Companies,
TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18.
208. Michon, supra note 206.
209. Daynard & Gottlieb, supra note 207, at 20.
210. Frank A. Sloan et al., States’ Allocations of Funds from the Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 220, 222 (2005); STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 204, at 12–13.
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tobacco suits until June 12, 1997, late in the process. 211 Eight days
later, the companies and states announced that a global settlement
agreement had been reached.212 Notably, the County of Los Angeles,
the City and County of San Francisco, and the City of San Jose were
the first and some of the only local government plaintiffs in the
country to sue tobacco companies and did so well before the state got
involved.213 As a result, they preserved local government interests in
the settlement, and California split its settlement funds with all of its
local governments—not just the three that sued—equally.214
3. Tobacco MSA Basics
The MSA bound forty-six states, five territories, D.C., and the
five largest tobacco companies who collectively owned over 99
percent of the tobacco market.215 In exchange for dropping all claims,
states receive annual payments from the companies totaling $246
billion between 2000 and 2025.216 Major highlights of the agreement
include: a moratorium on advertising targeting minors, regulating
tobacco industry lobbying, reimbursement of states’ attorney’s fees,
payments to both a smoking-prevention public education fund and
national foundation, and opening internal industry records and
research to the public.217 The agreement did not mandate how states
spent their settlement money nor how states distributed settlement
money to local governments if at all.218 The Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) recommends that 12 percent of settlement and tobacco
sales tax money go to comprehensive state tobacco control
programs.219 In 2014, only seven states were funding tobacco control
211. Inside the Tobacco Deal, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
settlement/timelines/fullindex.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
212. Id.
213. Report, Task Force on Tobacco Litigation, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 575, 581 n.1 (1997);
STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note 204, at 13.
214. Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222; STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note
204, at 13.
215. Joy Johnson Wilson, Summary of the Attorneys General Master Tobacco Settlement
Agreement, AFI HEALTH COMM. (Mar. 1999), https://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/tobacc
o/summary.htm#Statute.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Fast Facts and Fact Sheets, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/index.htm#:~:text=Smoking%20costs%2
0the%20United%20States,those%20funds%20on%20tobacco%20control (last reviewed Dec. 10,
2020).
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or smoking prevention programs at CDC-recommended levels or
higher.220 In 2020, none was.221
The MSA mandated that state legislatures pass a model statute
requiring any tobacco companies who did not agree to settle “to
require that such manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee
a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from
deriving large, short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof
before liability may arise.”222 States that did not pass the model statute
faced a reduction in settlement payments.223 This ensured that the
settlement was globally enforceable among defendants and even
companies not named in the suit.
4. California’s Share of the MSA
As of 2019, California has received a total of $16,550,051,823 in
MSA payments.224 It has spent $250,400,000 (or 1.5 percent) on
tobacco prevention efforts.225 California and New York, which
account for the largest payouts from the MSA, are the only states that
chose to split MSA money with local governments, in part due to the
fact that cities and counties in both states filed their own suits
alongside the attorneys general.226 In California, a Memorandum of
Understanding between the state and local governments was executed
in August of 1998, before the MSA was finalized.227 It governs the
division of MSA funds between the state, cities, and counties.228 The
state keeps 50% of MSA funds, the counties receive 45% apportioned
by population, and 5% goes to the state’s four largest cities.229 Since
then, the state, counties, and cities have sold off interest in future MSA
payments by securitizing them and issuing high-risk bonds.230
220. Cezary Podkul & Yue Qiu, Tobacco Bonds May Be Dangerous to Your State’s Financial
Health, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 7, 2014), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/tbcbonds-statemap.
221. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39.
222. Wilson, supra note 215.
223. Id.
224. Payments to Date (as of April 18, 2019), Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. (2019) (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
225. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39.
226. Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220; Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222.
227. Memorandum of Understanding at 17–18, In re Tobacco Cases, No. JCCP 4041 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1998).
228. Id. at 12–14.
229. Id. at 12–13; Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222.
230. Issue Brief, Tobacco Securitization Bond Issuance in California, Nova Edwards, Cal.
Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n 2, 7–8, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/tobacco.pdf

(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/19/21 2:46 PM

LITIGATING AN OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN CALIFORNIA

311

Securitization and reappropriation of MSA funds are not
uncommon. Though recent research has shown that public health
prevention efforts yield a high return on investment,231 in the 1990s,
many states secured their share of the tobacco MSA or put money into
their general funds to patch up budget shortfalls.232 Even in states with
the best laid plans, MSA funds have been subject to disagreements
within statehouses regarding budgets and executive power, enabled by
the fact that the terms of MSA do not bind states to use their funds
exclusively for tobacco-related public health purposes.233 As one
author wrote, “[t]he tragedy of the MSA is that it was a unique
opportunity to build a sustainable tobacco control (or broader public
health) infrastructure. With only 18% of the MSA revenues, every
state could have funded its tobacco control program at CDCrecommended levels, with no other funding needed.”234 A global
settlement in the opioid litigation could provide similar public health
research and crisis control funding for the epidemic but may only be
effective if states do not appropriate funds to non-public health
purposes.
There is a few ways MSA funds have been protected, in some
cases by voters. In 2000, just as the first settlements were paid out,
Orange County voters approved Measure H, an initiative that
earmarked the county’s share of the MSA funds to 12% tobacco
prevention and control, 20% to the sheriff’s department, and the
remaining 68% to other public health initiatives.235 Similarly, San Jose
County voted to allocate their funds to a children’s health insurance
(last visited Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Cal. Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n Issue Brief]; STATES’
USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note 204, at 9, 44–48; Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220.
231. Julia A. Dilley et al., Program, Policy, and Price Interventions for Tobacco Control:
Quantifying the Return on Investment of a State Tobacco Control Program, 102 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH e22, e27 (2012) (finding that in Washington State for every dollar spent, the state saved
five dollars in tobacco-related public health costs).
232. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39; Berman, supra note 39,
at 1038, 1041–46.
233. See Berman, supra note 39 at 1036, 1040–42. It stands to reason that MSA funds
appropriately allocated to tobacco programming would be helpful in combatting the consequences
of tobacco use that were unforeseeable at the time of the MSA like the rise in vaping-related
respiratory illness. The same could be said for future issues yet unknown arising out of the opioid
epidemic.
234. Berman, supra note 39, at 1058.
235. CNTY. OF ORANGE CAL., HEALTH CARE AGENCY, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS
OUTCOMES REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010–2011, at 1,
https://www.ochealthinfo.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=22537 (last visited Oct.
4, 2020).
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program.236 This is one method voters could use to protect any opioid
settlement or judgment funds. Furthermore, it could work at all levels
of government: state, county, and city.
Paralleling the first few settlements in the tobacco litigation, some
early settlements in the opioid litigation have been reached. Oklahoma
prevailed at trial in state court against manufacturer Johnson &
Johnson for over $400 million.237 Manufacturer Mallinckrodt is the
first drug company to reach a global settlement with forty-seven states
and territories for $1.6 billion.238 Concerns about how plaintiffs in
these early cases plan to use their settlement and judgment money are
growing.239 Lawmakers in states like Oklahoma are attempting to
control the distribution of opioid settlement money away from
research and treatment and directly into the state treasury where it
could be used for any state expense.240
As of 2018, Mariposa County received a total of $3.5 million
from MSA payments.241 In fiscal year 2018–2019 the county received
$193,157 in MSA payments242 and used it for after-school bussing, a
Rural Media Arts Program, and the construction of four fire
stations.243 As of 2018, the City of Los Angeles received a total of over
$196 million from MSA payments.244 In fiscal year 2018–2019, the
city received $10.9 million245 which was put into the city’s general
fund.246 Since 1999, the state government has received over $8.2
236. Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222.
237. Colin Dwyer & Jackie Fortier, Oklahoma Judge Shaves $107 Million Off Opioid Decision
Against Johnson and Johnson, NPR (Nov. 15, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/15/7
79439374/oklahoma-judge-shaves-107-million-off-opioid-decision-against-johnson-johnson.
238. Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, Mallinckrodt Reaches $1.6 Billion Deal to Settle Opioid
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/health/mallinckrodtopioid-settlement.html.
239. Sean Murphy, Concerns Arise About How Oklahoma’s Opioid Settlement Money Will Be
Used, INS. J. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.Insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2019/08/29/5
38343.htm.
240. Jackie Fortier, Here’s What Happened to $829M Oklahoma Was Awarded to Treat Opioid
Addiction, PUB. RADIO TULSA (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.publicradiotulsa.org/post/heres-whathappened-829m-oklahoma-was-awarded-treat-opioid-addiction.
241. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 19.
242. Id.
243. Mariposa County Budget, Final Budget Fiscal Year 2018–19, Cnty. of Mariposa 58,
https://mariposacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/70481/FY-18-19-Final-Adopted-Budget (last
visited Oct. 4, 2020).
244. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 19.
245. Id.
246. City of Los Angeles Budget, Budget Fiscal Year 2018–19, City of L.A. 16, 33 (May 25,
2018).
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billion in MSA payments.247 Even though the state legislature passed
a bill limiting state expenditures of the MSA to “health purposes”
including health care expansions like Medi-Cal, “education and
outreach, including, but not limited to, efforts to help reduce the use
of tobacco products. . . . [s]moking cessation services. . . .
[e]nforcement of tobacco-related statutes. . . . [and] primary care and
other state-funded clinics that serve low-income, uninsured, or
underinsured Californians,”248 as of 2014, the state has only spent 8.9
percent on smoking prevention.249
The California Legislature also passed laws capping the amount
of tobacco securitization bonds at $5 billion, but that was later
repealed.250 As of 2009, the state had securitized 78.4 percent of its
future MSA revenues through bonds.251
The structure of the MSA is such that after the twenty-five-year
payment period ends states will continue to receive smaller MSA
payments in perpetuity tied to tobacco sales.252 The more sales, the
higher the payments. Counterintuitively, states are encouraged to use
the money from tobacco sales on public health programs to control
and curtail tobacco use, thus reducing their payments from the settling
companies over time.253 Unfortunately, the structure of the settlement
actually disincentivizes local governments from controlling tobacco
use in their communities because the MSA generates revenue. Many
governments, especially small local ones, may in fact rely on MSA
payments and sizable sales taxes on tobacco products to pay bond debt
and to balance the budget. As one scholar wrote, “for public health,
the size of any settlement may matter less than how the settlement is
structured.”254
III. ANALYSIS
While there are many lessons from tobacco plaintiffs’ decadeslong struggle, California plaintiffs should take heed of two. First, like
247. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 20.
248. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104898 (Deering 2020).
249. Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220.
250. Cal. Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n Issue Brief, supra note 230, at 4.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id. at 8.
253. See id.
254. Faith Khalik et al., Learning the Lessons of Tobacco: A Public Health Approach to the
Opioid Settlements, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1
377/hblog20190925.554104/full/.
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the California cities and counties that sued tobacco companies
independently of the state, asserting claims now and maintaining
control of them throughout litigation greatly increase the chance of
maintaining control over a portion of any settlement or judgment.
Second, unless states are bound by legislation, public initiative,
referendum, or settlement terms, states will not use settlement or
judgment funds for public health. Legislators at all levels of
government cannot resist the temptation to use opioid funds to patch
holes in budgets or on non-public health expenses.255
On the whole, opioid plaintiffs seem to have learned the first
lesson from the MSA. The sheer number and diversity of plaintiffs is
evidence of this. Plaintiffs even formed a new class action tool called
the negotiation class and for the most part have hired within the same
small group of plaintiffs’ firms and tobacco litigation veterans to
represent them on contingency. Both the negotiation class and
plaintiffs’ firms have created a surprisingly unified front in the Opioid
MDL while simultaneously exacerbating fractures between cities and
counties and their state governments that were initially exposed by the
tobacco litigation.256 In the tobacco litigation, the fault lines between
different levels of government were never resolved. Now those
divisions may hamper some plaintiffs’ bargaining power and make
negotiation exceedingly difficult for defendants. If the MDL
negotiation class is upheld on appeal, it may prove to be the major
procedural legacy of the opioid litigation even as fractures between
local and state governments grow deeper as a result.
The second lesson is more important now than ever. While
including public health spending mandates in any settlement
agreement is the best option, short of that, plaintiffs, in consultation
with public health agencies, can begin crafting statutes, resolutions,
and memorandums of understanding for state legislatures and city and
county councils with specific public health programs in mind. The
255. This temptation may prove increasingly difficult to overcome, as other public health
emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic create widespread economic damage. See Jeannie
Baumann & Jacquie Lee, Virus Pandemic, Opioid Epidemic Collide Around Social Distancing,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 7, 2020, 3:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-lifesciences/virus-pandemic-opioid-epidemic-collide-around-social-distancing; Nicola Cantore et al.,
Coronavirus: The Economic Impact—10 July 2020, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG. (July 10,
2010), https://www.unido.org/stories/coronavirus-economic-impact-10-july-2020.
256. Jan Hoffman, States Clash with Cities over Potential Opioids Settlement Payouts, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/health/opioids-litigationsettlement.html.
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benefits of starting this process early are many. First, with a plan
already in place, treatment and recovery resources will enter the
community faster. Second, legislation will ensure that absent
amendment or repeal, funds are spent on opioid treatment and
recovery in the long-term rather than diverted to other government
expenses. Third, it avoids a potentially difficult initiative or
referendum process. Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), ballot initiatives have become a widely used health policy
tool.257 States not known for strong social safety nets nor robust public
health funding have seen voters mandate the expansion of Medicaid
under the ACA.258 Legislators at all levels of government have an
opportunity to avoid a public fight about how to spend any opioid
funds by beginning to plan now. Otherwise, California’s heavily used
ballot measure process combined with public scrutiny surrounding the
structure of early opioid settlements is a straightforward recipe for a
ballot measure or initiative. For instance, San Jose’s children’s health
insurance ballot measure and Orange County’s Measure H in 2000
reserving county tobacco settlement funds to specific programs may
be a useful template for public health interest groups and voters who
want to use the initiative process to protect opioid funds for public
health purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
While many question the role of public health litigation in
stopping and solving the opioid epidemic,259 it is clear that the opioid
litigation, the most widely pleaded and argued public health litigation
ever, is not just rewriting the rules of public health litigation, but those
of multidistrict litigation and class action. For California, the state may
not be aggressive enough in its pleading, particularly when one
considers where the epidemic overlaps with other major issues of state

257. See Akeiisa Coleman et al., Medicaid Expansion Across the Country: A Check-In on
Recent Ballot Initiatives, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.commonwe
althfund.org/blog/2019/medicaid-expansion-across-country-check-recent-ballot-initiatives.
258. Id.
259. Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, THE
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/lawsuitpharmaceutical-companies-opioids/529020/; Holly M. Karibo, Why Lawsuits Alone Aren’t the
Opioid Solution We Need, CNN (Apr. 3, 2019, 3:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/03/opini
ons/purdue-pharma-settlement-not-the-solution-karibo/index.html.
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policy, like homelessness and the COVID-19 pandemic.260 All
California plaintiffs are no doubt paying close attention to the second
round of bellwethers, particularly City and County of San Francisco
v. McKesson Corp. Because each test case alleges similar claims, City
of San Francisco should prove to be an informative bellwether and
provide useful information for settlement negotiation and trial strategy
for all parties.261 All three plaintiffs should seek a lucrative settlement
in lieu of trial, particularly the state, considering that pursuing its
claims could entail a lengthy home rule fight, and a judgment may
yield less money than a settlement.
As a public health tool, settlement is much more effective than
trial. Consider broadly the remedies available at trial: public
accountability and disclosure. However, relief is limited to damages
assessed by a judge or jury and some injunctive powers. On the other
hand, settlement offers more flexibility to creatively craft public health
prevention efforts in a way a jury or judge simply cannot. Pursuing
settlement of the opioid litigation with public health and opioid use
disorder and addiction prevention budget mandates remains the best
chance many local governments have at recouping money lost in
fighting the epidemic right now and investing in the public health
prevention and treatment efforts that will stop it in the long term.
Litigation cannot stop the opioid epidemic, but it can jumpstart the
public health strategies and programs that will.

260. See Homeless and Housing Services Providers Confront Opioid Overdose, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (July 10,
2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/homelessness-programs-resources/hpr-resources/homelesshousing-services-providers-confront-opioid; Thomas Fuller et al., As Homelessness Surges in
California, So Does a Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/
21/us/california-homeless-backlash.html; L.A. CNTY. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CTR. FOR HEALTH
IMPACT EVALUATION, RECENT TRENDS IN MORTALITY RATES AND CAUSES OF DEATH AMONG
PEOPLE EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 3, 5 (2019), https://publicheal
th.lacounty.gov/chie/reports/HomelessMortality_CHIEBrief_Final.pdf; Jason McGahan,
Homeless Opioid Deaths Force Change in L.A. Jails, CAP. & MAIN (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://capitalandmain.com/homeless-opioid-deaths-force-change-in-los-angeles-jails-1121;
Baumann & Lee, supra note 255.
261. Remand Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 2804, at 3 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 5,
2020).

